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NOTES
THE "CLEAN HANDS" DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO
MARRIAGE ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS
A marriage annulment occasionally is sought by a person who
alleges the invalidity of the marriage because of a prior marriage undissolved, or because of consanguinity. Often the plaintiff in such proceedings was aware of the impediment at the time of the marriage ceremony. Since the annulment of a marriage is in the nature of a proceeding in equity, the question arises: Is the equitable maxim to be applied
that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands"?
It is an elementary principle of the common law that a marriage
entered into, when one of the parties has a spouse living at the time
and not divorced, is absolutely void.1 However, the reported decisions
are in conflict as to whether the courts should judicially declare such
marriages to be void. Some courts insist that the "clean hands" doctrine must be applied and refuse to act, leaving the parties where it
finds them. 2 Others, concluding that the interest of society intervenes,
and that public policy requires the status of the parties to be determined, have accordingly refused to apply the equitable doctrine. 3
Illustrative of the first type of case is the New Jersey decision of
Tyll v. Keller.4 Here the plaintiff married the defendant who had a
former husband still living and undivorced. Then he sought to have the
second marriage annulled, basing his claim on the fact that his wife
was already married when she went through the marriage ceremony
with him. The court refused relief and held the plaintiff would have
to prove by preponderance of the evidence not only the former marriage of his wife and the fact that she had never been divorced, but
that he married defendant in ignorance of these facts, and that he was
innocent of any intentional violation of the law.
2 Graham v. Bennett, 2 Cal. 503; Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass. 385, 6 N.E. 238
(1886); Reenes v. Reenes, 51 111. 332 (1870); Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass.
190, 28 N.E. 260 (1891).
2Tyll v. Keller, 92 N.J.Eq. 426, 120 AtI. 6 (1922); White v. Kessler, 101 N.J.Eq.
369, 139 AtI. 24 (1927); Ancrum v. Ancrum, 9 N.J. Misc. 795, 156 AtI. 22
(1931); Rooney v. Rooney, 54 N.J.Eq. 231, 34 AtI. 682 (1896); Whitehouse
v. Whitehouse, 129 Me. 24, 149 AtI. 572 (1930) ; Berry v. Berry, 114 N.Y. Supp.
497, 130 App. Div. 53 (1909); Brown v. Brown, 138 N.Y. Supp. 602, 153 App.
Div. 645 (1912); Thompson v. Thompson, 10 Phila. 131 (1874); Tefft v.
Tefft, 35 Ind. 44 (1871).
3Lynch v. Lynch, 34 R.I. 261, 83 At]. 83 (1912); Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F.
(2d) 690 (Wash. D.C.) (1927); Pain v. Pain, 37 Mo. App. 100 (1889);
Hunt v. Hunt, 252 Ill. App. 490 (1929); Seacord v. Seacord, 33 W. W. Harr.
(Del.) 485, 139 AtI. 80 (1927).
492 N.J.Eq. 426, 120 Atl. 6 (1922).

NOTES

In a similar holding, Whitehouse v Whitehouse,5 the Maine Court
held that a husband who was guilty of illicit sexual intercourse with a
woman before marriage, could not, after marriage and more than four
months cohabitation with her, in equity and good conscience put her
from him by annulment, even if she induced the marriage through
fraud.
As an example of cases holding the opposite view and refusing to
apply the "clean hands" doctrine, we have Simmons v Simmons.6 Here
the plaintiff and defendant were living together as husband and wife
although it was known at the time that the plaintiff was a married
woman. The plaintiff brought suit for a divorce, and the defendant
husband in his answer asked for an annulment on the theory that his
marriage to the plaintiff was void because of her prior marriage. The
annulment was granted, the court reasoning that in a proceeding to
annul a marriage the equitable principle of "clean hands" is inapplicable.
In such cases the interest of society intervenes, and the state is regarded as a third party to the action. Likewise, in Lynch v. Lynch,'
the court granted an annulment to the plaintiff who was already married when she went through a marriage ceremony with defendant.
This case held the second marriage was a nullity and the fact that the
parties were in pari delicto made no difference, since their legal status
is "something in which the state as well as the parties is interested."
The New York Court has evidently made a distinction and will
grant relief only at the suit of the party not under the disability. Thus,
in Berry v. Berry,8 the plaintiff, receiving information by letter that
his wife was dead and without making further inquiry, married the
defendant, stating to her at the time that he was single rather than
widowed, and that this was his first marriage. The parties continued to
cohabit even after ascertaining that the first wife was still alive. The
court held the plaintiff could not maintain the action for annulment of
the second marriage. This was held to be true even though by statute
it was provided that an action for annulment could be maintained
where the former husband or wife of one of the parties to the marriage was living, and the former marriage was in force at the time
of the second marriage. It was stated that while the jurisdiction of
the court acting as a court of chancery in matrimonial matters is conferred and regulated by statute, yet, in the exercise of that jurisdiction,
unless controlled by positive enactments, it proceeds as a court of
equity, and the maxim, "the plaintiff must come into equity with clean
5129 Me. 24, 149 AtI. 572 (1930).

619 F. (2d), (Wash. D.C.) (1927).
734 R.I. 261, 83 AtI. 83 (1912).
8 114 N.Y. Supp. 497, 130 App. Div. 53 (1909).
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hands," applies to prevent maintenance of the action. It was further
held that the statute providing that the action under such circumstances
could be maintained by either of the parties during the lifetime of the
other, or by the former husband or wife, "did not operate in favor of a
guilty husband, who has knowingly and wickedly contracted a bigamous
marriage and subsequently grown tired of the new wife." The court
under the general principles of equity will give him no aid.
The same court, one year later, in the case of Stokes v. Stokes,9
granted an annulment to the plaintiff who after learning that his wife's
first husband was alive continued to cohabit with her. The court stated:
"While it may well be that there are extreme cases where the position
of the party seeking relief of the kind here sought is so inequitable that
a court of equity will refuse to interfere, no such defense was sufficiently proved in the case before us."
From the above cases it is apparent that the New York Courts
have made a distinction between the case of the one under disability
seeking relief, and that of the one not under disability seeking relief,
granting relief only to the latter. This distinction is further pointed
out in Brown v. Brown,10 where a woman commenced an action to
annul her marriage upon the ground that her husband had a wife living and undivorced at the time it was contracted. It was held the relief
asked for would be granted even though she knew of the former marriage, and that the wife of that marriage was still alive. The court commented on Stokes v. Stokes" and Berry v. Berry 2 stating: "While the
equitable principle made the basis of our decision in Berry v. Berry
seems to be recognized in the opinion of Judge Vann in the Stokes
case, yet, he declined to apply it to the facts then before the court.
In view of that decision of the court of last resort, we feel bound to
limit the Berry case to the facts there before the court, to wit, where a
guilty party asks the aid of the court to relieve himself of the consequences of his own wrongdoing." "Guilty," according to the New
York cases, thus means "guilty of bigamy."
The question as to whether the "clean hands" maxim should be
applied arises also in proceedings wherein annulment of a marriage is
sought because of consanguinity. In the case of Weisberg v. Weisberg,13
the plaintiff's complaint alleged she and the defendant were married
and voluntarily lived together as husband and wife for fourteen years.
She asked the court to annul the marriage on the ground that it was
incestuous and void owing to the fact that the parties stood in relation9 198 N.Y. 301, 91 N.E. 793 (1910).
20139 N.Y. Supp. 602 (1912).
n2 Supra note 9.
' Supra note 8.
1398 N.Y. Supp. 260, 112 App. Div. 231 (1906).
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ship to each other of uncle and niece. The decree was refused, the
court deciding that the plaintiff contracted the marriage voluntarily and
with full knowledge of her relationship to the defendant, and could not
have the same annulled after cohabiting with defendant as his wife
for over fourteen years. In further discussing the problem the court
stated that in the absence of statute it would not be warranted in going
further in declaring marriages void than those in the direct line of consanguinity and between brothers and sisters in the collateral line. Marriages between uncles and nieces, although prohibited by statute, were
not so prohibited until after this marriage took place.
In an Illinois Case, Arado v. Arado,14 the wife sued the husband
for a divorce and the husband filed a cross bill alleging the illegality of
the marriage by reason of the parties being first cousins. The question
in the case was whether or not a statute declaring marriages of first
cousins to be voia should be interpreted as declaring that such a marriage is void in the sense of a nullity, or as being voidable and possessing validity until disaffirmed by the act of one or both parties to the
marriage, so that the right to disaffirm might be lost by conduct creating an equitable estoppel. It was finally decided that the general rule
that equity will not entertain the complaint of one who comes into
equity with unclean hands does not apply to this type of case, and there
could be no estoppel against the right of the defendant to allege the
illegality of the marriage.
The fact that the parties to the marriage cannot continue their relationship without engaging in open immorality, and without repeatedly
committing a criminal act, is a strong reason for unhesitatingly declaring it void. This idea is well expressed in Martin v. Martin,5 where it
appeared that the parties, being prohibited from marrying in West Virginia because of relationship by blood, were married in Pennsylvania.
After living together for eighteen years, the husband brought suit to
annul the marriage. The lower court dismissed the bill upon the ground
that equity should not entertain a litigant who through his own iniquity
would bring further disgrace upon his child, his wife, and himself.
An appeal was taken and the upper court in reversing the decree said:
"If the parties could continue the marriage relationship without violating the criminal laws of the state, then the court might be justified in
refusing to entertain the plaintiff's bill. But, when the law forbids the
continuance of their marriage relation, notwithstanding its inception
may have been a misdemeanor, it is the duty of both parties to make
restitution by having the marriage annulled promptly. Their hands may
be unclean, but it is the duty of the court of equity to permit them to
14 281 Ill.
123, 117 N.E. 816 (1917).
15 53 W.Va. 301, 46 S.E. 120 (1903).

216

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

clean them, when it can do so, and not permit such uncleanness to
continue as a stench in the nostrils of the people."
In conclusion, it is suggested that the marriages should be declared
void by the court at the suit of either party. The marriage is no more
or less a nullity, and the weight of the claims of society is not diminished, simply because the disqualified party seeks the relief. In many
cases, the lapse of time will render it difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain the true status of the illegal marriage by reason of loss of
evidence. It seems that the subversion of public policy to the equitable
maxim must inevitably be attended by social detriment, with very little, if any, social benefit.
MATTHEW

J. DOYLE.

